Thinking of Ukraine I ran across this poem by W. H. Auden

September 1, 1939

W. H. Auden – 1907-1973

I sit in one of the dives
On Fifty-second Street
Uncertain and afraid
As the clever hopes expire
Of a low dishonest decade:
Waves of anger and fear
Circulate over the bright
And darkened lands of the earth,
Obsessing our private lives;
The unmentionable odour of death
Offends the September night.

Accurate scholarship can
Unearth the whole offence
From Luther until now
That has driven a culture mad,
Find what occurred at Linz,
What huge image made
A psychopathic god:
I and the public know
What all schoolchildren learn,
Those to whom evil is done
Do evil in return.

(Sept. 1, 1939 was the start of WW II. The culture driven mad was Germany. The psychopathic god was Hitler. PB)

ukrainian flag in peter bakke yard 2022

Ukrainian flag in my front yard. Saddlebrooke, Tucson, AZ.

Brzezinski and his Great Game

The Grand Chessboard
IR 6602 – Geostrategy

Troy University

Peter Bakke
[email protected]

Cover of "The Grand Chessboard: American ...
Cover via Amazon

The temptation of imperial overreach, to become the Athens of the twenty-first century and embark on self-defeating Sicilian expeditions, is ever-present… which is born of arrogance of power.
Robert J. Art

Intervening everywhere is not an option.
Richard Haas

What I fear is not the enemy’s strategy, but our own mistakes.

Every country has a wish list that reads like a menu without prices.
Joseph Nye

Future ages may well shudder with horror as they remember us.
Martin van Creveld

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s book “The Grand Chessboard: American primacy and its geostrategic imperative” serves as a blueprint for 21st century U.S. foreign policy. In the book, Brzezinski, a former National Security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, argues that Eurasia is the keystone to America’s future as the world’s first and (according to Brzezinski) possibly last global superpower. Eurasia is thus the geography-based chessboard upon which the “Grand Game” is to be played and Brzezinski’s premise is that the United States and its allies are competing for global hegemony against other coalitions and major powers – principally Russia, China and Japan. Brzezinski states:

It is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America. The formulation of a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geostrategy is therefore the purpose of this book.” (italics in original) (p xiv) 

The roots of Brzezinski’s Eurasian-centric worldview can be traced to his own personal background as an exile from Nazi/Soviet occupied Poland and also from the well known geopolitical discussions that were held in the early years of the previous century when Halford Mackinder (not Harold, as Brzezinski writes) and Karl Haushofer each weighed in on the underpinnings of geopolitics. The pedigree of Brzezinski’s book therefore appears to be largely based on realist power politics. However, I will argue that Brzezinski’s prescriptions for continued American global hegemony are aligned more in the vein of multilateralist liberal internationalism than the hardcore realist and unilateralist approaches of Mackinder and Haushofer. I will also discuss a recurring theme that runs through the entire book – what seems to be Brzezinski’s pervasive and poorly substantiated imperative for America to rescue the world from itself. Furthermore, I will point out that Brzezinski’s call for American empire is based on a weak discussion of vital (versus desirable) American national interests supporting his argument. Brzezinski also discloses a complete disregard for the populous and resource-rich continents of South America and Africa in his geopolitical musings about the need to oppose a future Eurasian competitor. Lastly, Brzezinski displays a complete lack of respect for the utility of the United Nations.

In his book, Brzezinski frequently acknowledges the American public’s reticence for empire, but nonetheless relentlessly presses for the continuation and even expansion of American global hegemony. He also hints about, but does not explore, the visceral and militant Islamic opposition to American hegemony spanning a wide swath of the planet. Like most critiques of Mackinder’s and Haushofer’s ideas, Brzezinski shows no inclination to analyze events from a non-Western perspective. What China, Russia or Japan think about the writings of Mackinder and Haushofer is explored in few, if any, Western-oriented readings on geopolitics that I encountered – just as Brzezinski fails to explore his exhortations of American empire in any alternate light of non-Western attitudes and reactions. He explores his ideas from a consistently Western viewpoint, seeming to be nonchalant about how his aggressive grand plans may be seen from Beijing, Moscow or Tokyo. He extols America’s democratic, economic, military and cultural virtues and ignores any vices whatsoever.

—– —– —–

Brzezinski begins his book with a brief rationalization for why America needs to be the world’s global policeman. His argument is discussed more below, but it could be summed up as: “It goes without saying.” Brzezinski then takes the reader on a whirlwind tour of world military history. He touches briefly on the Roman, Chinese, and Mongol imperial empires – giving special admiration to the vast extent of the Mongol conquest (and its surprisingly quick demise). He then describes the rise and decline of several European powers including Spain, Germany and Britain. He ends this brief magical history tour with America’s rapid emergence as the world’s first “indispensable country,” one that stands supreme above all others and which reigns as “the only comprehensive global superpower” (Brzezinski, 1997, p.24).

Brzezinski focuses exclusively on the importance of the Eurasian continent and its momentousness to the world, to the exclusion of all other worldviews. This “World-Island” is a vast region that Mackinder called the “Heartland” and the “geographical pivot of world history” (Mackinder, p. 27). Mackinder believed that whoever controlled the Heartland controlled the world – a feeling obviously shared by Brzezinski. In his time, Mackinder saw the Heartland as a threat to British supremacy, particularly if Germany and Russia formed an alliance that would create an axis “from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” thus creating his worst fear that “the empire of the world would then be in sight” (Mackinder, p. 30). Haushofer, on the other hand, saw the Heartland as a vast store of physical resources and raw materials for the German people, a place that he considered to be the “mystical cradle of world conquerors” (Parker, (2), p. 106). Brzezinski seems to firmly believe in Mackinder’s famous axiom:

Who rules East Europe controls the Heartland
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island
Who rules the World-Island commands the World. 

With the control of Mackinder’s Heartland in mind, Brzezinski proposes that there are four regions that the U.S. should concentrate its military, diplomatic and economic resources upon (he calls use of such resources a policy of “maneuver and manipulation”). His four areas of major concern all border on the Heartland and include the “Democratic Bridgehead” (Europe), the “Black Hole” (Russia), the “Eurasian Balkans,” (former Soviet republics in Central Asia) and the “Far Eastern Anchor” (Japan). He devotes a chapter to each of these pan-regions, theorizing in each about a dizzying variety of moves and counter moves and the advantages and disadvantages of each area. However, his main thesis regarding fear that a preponderant competitor will arise out of Eurasia seems to be undermined by his own writing that questions the ability of any one power to unite the vast “World-Island” of Eurasia: “Cumulatively, Eurasia’s power vastly overshadows America’s (but) Eurasia is too big to be politically one” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 31). If Eurasia is too big to unite, how can any Eurasian power threaten America? This is particularly relevant if America continues and strengthens its alliances with other major non-Eurasian centers of power such as Europe and South America.

“The Grand Chessboard” concludes with Brzezinski counseling the reader that “The time has come for the United States to formulate and prosecute an integrated, comprehensive, and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia,” and he adds that “… how it manages Eurasia’s key geographic pivots will be crucial to the longevity and stability of America’s global primacy” (Brzezinski, 1997, p 194). These recommendations have immense social and economic cost implications for the people of the United States. How long can the American public continue to subsidize such an American empire? Brzezinski does not address the issue, although it is clear that he recognizes the limits of the American public’s support of open-ended, ill-defined international engagements.
“America is too democratic at home to be autocratic abroad. This limits the use of America’s power, especially its capacity for military intimidation. Never before has a populist democracy attained international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is not a goal that commands popular passion, except in conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the public’s sense of domestic well-being. The economic self-denial (that is, defense spending) and the human sacrifice (casualties, even among professional soldiers) required in the effort are uncongenial to democratic instincts. Democracy is inimical to imperial mobilization.” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 35)

Brzezinski also worries, like Alfred Thayer Mahan, that “democracies (are) unwilling to pay the price of continued … power and had not the foresight to ensure adequate military preparedness” (Sprout, p. 420). So, despite Brzezinski’s acknowledgement of the American public’s reticence to American empire, he continues to press on with his global Leviathan antidote to the world’s ills. Additionally he states, “The attitude of the American public toward the external projection of American power has been ambivalent … (there is) a general public preference for ‘sharing’ global power with others, rather than for its monopolistic exercise” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 24, p. 26). Despite obvious public reluctance to support American empire, it is Dr. Brzezinski’s strong belief that continued massive global engagement is in the best interest of the United States.

His complete disregard for the possible use of South American (and even African) resources to counter a rising Eurasian competitor is striking. Even Mackinder noted more than a half century ago that, “The development of the vast potentialities of South America might have a decisive influence upon the system,” (Mackinder, p. 31) which might be utilized to strengthen the United States against a rising Eurasian competitor or coalition. Mackinder also postulated that the “insular crescent” of countries surrounding the Heartland could come together as a counterweight to a Eurasian power. Brzezinski advocates a grand strategy that completely ignores America’s own backyard. The small nation of Singapore is mentioned six times in the book, but no mention is made of Brazil or other potential resource-rich South American partners. His book is unabashedly Eurasian-centric, but in the meantime, recent news indicates that China is pushing its influence in Central and South America, including a compact with Cuba to drill for offshore oil (Janofsky).

Brzezinski is seen by many as a Cold Warrior. Does he still see the world through that lens? How did Brzezinski’s worldview come about? Much of his policy reasoning can be traced to the influence of geopolitical theorists such as Mahan, Mackinder and Haushofer, however I want to briefly explore some personal aspects of Brzezinski’s life that may have solidified his hawkish cum liberal internationalist view of the world.
Brzezinski was born in 1928 to a Polish diplomat. The postings of his father took young Brzezinski to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. In 1938 his father was posted to Canada and shortly thereafter the Nazis invaded Poland. The destruction of Poland in 1939, incidentally, was hailed by the geopolitician Haushofer as “a heroic stroke of seldom attained greatness” (Herwig, p. 234). The Brzezinski family subsequently found themselves exiled without a home country (Brzezinski, 2006). Following the war, the usurpation of Poland by the USSR, agreed to by the Allies at the Yalta Conference, must have been a bitter blow to Brzezinski. The loss of Poland to the Communist bloc was to him an example of power politics incarnate. It meant that Brzezinski could not return to his native country. Poland was forcibly occupied by the current tenants of the Heartland (that is, by Soviet Russia, as Mackinder would put it) (Parker, 2, p. 106). The military domination of his homeland by the Nazis, then the Soviets, followed by the cruel matter of handing over Poland to the post-war Soviet bloc must have left an indelible mark on Brzezinski – one which likely informed his worldview that military power was key to the fate of nations and also that the geographic position of Poland between the two great powers of Germany and Russia had a fateful effect upon its history.

Brzezinski eventually moved to the United States and became a citizen in 1958. When he did not get tenure at Harvard University, he moved to New York and taught at Columbia. During this time he began formulating and expressing his worldviews via several books. He was instrumental in the creation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE and became a co-founder of the Trilateral Commission. One member he asked to be part of the commission was Jimmy Carter. When Carter became President, Brzezinski was asked to become U.S. National Security Advisor (Brzezinski, 2006).

It was in this position of power that Brzezinski experienced first hand some geopolitical setbacks. While on his watch, the Iranian hostage crisis developed. It was at Brzezinski’s insistence that the ill-fated rescue attempt called ‘Desert One’ was executed to bring the hostages back – with disastrous results. The resulting domestic political fiasco had a negative effect upon Carter’s Presidential re-election bid, which he lost. Brzezinski also oversaw the nascent arming and training of Islamic fundamentalists who were used as proxies to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. This support eventually resulted in the financing and growth of some groups and individuals that eventually became al Qaeda.

Given these momentous personal experiences and the fact that his native country of Poland is part of the Heartland, it is not surprising that Brzezinski favors a Mackinder and Haushofer worldview that concentrates upon the Eurasian landmass. His belief in the virtues of American rule and its current place in the world easily explains his belief that it is America’s destiny to be vitally involved in every aspect of the Eurasian chessboard. Finally, the utility of NATO and its direct involvement in the containment and eventual demise of the USSR surely gave Brzezinski an abiding faith in the use of effective multilateral alliances to combat a global competitor.

—– —– —–

“The Grand Chessboard” appears to be written for popular consumption, not for a scholarly audience. For example, the book does not have consistent or adequate citations and Brzezinski does not provide a bibliography or a list of suggested readings. It is a relatively short monograph with seven chapters that each gives the feeling of a professorial lecture. Its extemporaneous tone continues in the mid-chapters with formulaic “if X happens then counter with Y” propositions. It is difficult for a reader to absorb the many permutations and combinations of U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and E.U. policy actions and reactions that are posed in these chapters.

A further shortcoming of the book is Brzezinski’s faint attempt to define exactly what America’s vital national interests are and how his policy of American empire protects them. It seems America is required to be the world’s policeman simply because Brzezinski says so. His primary reason for American hegemony appears simply to be the prevention of international anarchy (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 30). He states, “America’s withdrawal from the world or because of the sudden emergence of a successful rival – would produce massive international instability. In effect, it would prompt global anarchy.” This philosophy is reminiscent of the Islamic proverb, “Better a thousand days of tyranny than one day of anarchy.” Avoiding potential international chaos is a laudable goal, but it is only one leg of what should be a three- or four-legged structure. Despite the shortcomings described above, the book provides a wealth of geoploitical information. Also, Brzezinski’s writing style may be somewhat awkward, but his prose is efficient and to the point.

Brzezinski reveals in his writing a deep sense of what Alexis de Tocqueville called ‘American exceptionalism’ – which mirrors the deeply entrenched American idea of historical Manifest Destiny. Brzezinski’s evangelical ardor for America’s place in the sun is revealed by his admiration for the superiority of the American domestic experience, made clear by his statement that, “American global power is exercised through a global system of distinctively American design that mirrors the domestic American experience. Central to that domestic experience is the pluralistic character of both the American society and its political system” (Brzezinski, 1997, p 24). He further enthusiastically states that, “America’s political institutions and free market economy (create) unprecedented opportunities for ambitious and iconoclastic inventors, who were not inhibited from pursuing their personal dreams by archaic privileges or rigid social hierarchies” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 4).
It seems as if Brzezinski’s book is lecturing Andrew Jackson on the fine points of expanding the new American nation westward (or in the present case, globally) simply because it has so much to offer the world. Brzezinski continues by fretting, “What will America bequeath to the world as the enduring legacy of its primacy?” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 210). Let us hope that the historical judgment of the U.S., which Brzezinski seems to care so deeply about, it is not similar in tone to Hans Weigert’s condemnation of Haushofer’s strategy for world conquest: “It is here that this cold, hard, dynamic science of war-geography, backed by propaganda and maps of terrifying suggestion, is hammered out’ (Weigert, 1941, p. 3).

Much of the planet, particularly most of Islam, reacts negatively to Brzezinski’s belief in the superiority of American culture and virtues. His claim that America has “become the object of careful study and political imitation.” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 26) seems to be tone deaf to Islam’s insularity when it comes to the lure of the West. To his credit, Brzezinski does fire a warning shot across our bow (four years prior to 9-11) by stating: “A possible challenge to American primacy from Islamic fundamentalism (may occur) by exploiting religious hosility to the Ameican way of life… Islamic fundamentalism could undermine several pro-Western Middle Eastern governments” (Brzezinski, 1997, p 53).

Despite this momentary nod to Islamic reistance, Brzezinski yet again pushes with con brio the ideal of American global preponderance as a global good, stating: “The currently dominant American global system., within which ‘the threat of war is off the table,’ is likely to be stable only in those parts of the world in which American primacy, guided by a long-term geostrategy, rests on compatible and congenial sociopolitical systems. Linked together by American-dominated multilateral frameworks” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 56 ). However, history has shown us that modern war is not off the table, even in parts of the world dominated by American primacy (the Middle East for example), and the world is neither completely compatible nor congenial to all American interests, particulary those that have been forcibly imposed upon other nations.

Brzezinski’s thinly disguised belief that America is destined to be the world’s savior has a quality to it not unlike a post-modern Manifest Destiny. This forms the foundation for America’s continued belief that it is a morally superior nation and therefore it has a mission to convert the world to its way of life. The thrust of America’s mission is to spread its form of democracy, freedom and economic model to the rest of the world and of this mindset Brzezinski is a true believer.

In the early 1800’s, America pushed westward to prevent, in part, the further consolidation of the French and Spanish colonies in North America. Likewise, “The Grand Chessboard” proposes that America enter into the “Great Game” to “prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 40). Unlike Haushofer, who put the ‘terror’ in territory, Brzezinski does not propose the actual taking of land in the Heartland. He lobbies for indirect control via maneuver and manipulation in concert with our allies, recognizing that, “…the issue of territorial possession has lately been waning in salience” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 37). Parker tells us that “Haushofer saw Germany’s future as being above all an eastern one linked to the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia.” Brzezinski’s grand strategy comprises a similar Eurasian linkage for America’s continued global primacy.

Brzezinski has been called a ‘hawk,’ but his strategy laid out in “The Grand Chessboard” speaks more to liberal internationalism. To his credit, he realizes rightly that the U.S. alone cannot bear the burden of being the world’s global Leviathan. Such a view embraces liberal internationalism’s logic of requiring the cooperation of other nations to tackle a wide range of common problems. This cooperative multilateralism is implied by much of his writing, but one conspicuous absentee from any of his discussions is the United Nations. This institution, created in large part by the United States, has been engaged in 60 UN peacekeeping operations since 1948 (UN Peacekeeping Missions). These actions must be of considerable value to the United States that should be recognized and valued. Brzezinski mentions the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization and The World Bank as examples of a ‘web’ of special organizations that support American hegemony, but he lends no weight in the book whatsoever to the United Nations, other than mentioning the Security Council in passing. His lack of respect for this important institution is only exceeded by his ardor for NATO. Brzezinski seems to think that an Eastward expansion of NATO can solve most of America’s security dilemmas. His proposed creation of TESS (TransEuraian Security System) to help relieve America of some of its burden of empire is a transparent expansion of NATO into Eurasia (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 208).

There is a problem with Brzezinski’s dual call for American hegemony and reliance upon international cooperation to stem the rise of a Eurasian competitor. It centers on the fact that acting as a hegemonic power by definition alienates other nations. The United States claims to have the world’s common interests at heart, as Brzezinski tells us: “The ultimate objective of American policy should be benign and visionary: to shape a truly cooperative global community… in keeping with the fundamental interests of mankind (Brzezinski, 1997, p. xiv). However, any continued unilateral actions by the U.S. will be met with suspicion. This is seen today with the problems America is experiencing in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the global war on terrorism. To create a harmonious international consortium, the U.S. will have to yield leadership to other countries on at least a few common issues.

The following statement by Brzezinski is not an accurate portrayal of the situation American finds itself in today: “As the imitation of American ways gradually pervades the world, it creates a more congenial setting for the exercise of the indirect and seemingly consensual American hegemony… that hegemony involves a complex structure of interlocking institutions and procedures, designed to generate consensus” (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 27). This consensual, multilateral worldview may have been in the making during the post-Cold War1990’s when Brzezinski’s book was written, however this particular view has been generally abandoned under the Bush II administration in its first 6 years. Thankfully, there are signs that the administration is moving back towards a more consensual leadership role, including the use of European aid in the difficult negotiations with Iran regarding it nuclear program. The U.S. is even moving toward bilateral discussion with Iran, at the prodding of the European states.

Brzezinski’s proposed plan for American foreign policy has many names: global hegemony, preponderance, primacy, and empire. The case he puts forth in “The Grand Chessboard” is relatively simple – America is morally required to continue its dominant role on a global scale. But doing so results in a costly (and ghastly) toll of American blood and treasure, which Brzezinski largely ignores. In crafting and explaining his grand strategy, Brzezinski left out a thorough examination of its many costs. A recent poll indicates that worldwide respect for American values and culture continues to dwindle, even among staunch allied countries (Knowlton).

Brzezinski’s book could have had more impact had the author not only explored the costs of relinquishing empire, but of continuing and expanding it as is being done today in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have pointed out several other potential problems with Brzezinski’s strategy in addition to cost and arrogance, including a lack of respect for the utility of the United Nations, a total dismissal of Central and South America’s value in aiding the pursuit of American goals, a tone deaf approach to the global resistance of the spread of American democratic, economic and cultural ideals (particularly the violent resistance of Islam), a complete lack of non-western geopolitical analysis (resulting in a paucity of China, Japan and Russia perspectives to his interventionist strategies), and the absence of precisely defined vital (vs. desirable) national interests.

Many argue that America should resist the temptation of power because it will inevitably result in imperial overreach. Fettweis reminds us that, at a minimum, continued American expansion would virtually assure the rise of a Eurasian competitor or alliance of competitors (Fettweis, p. 10). So, the basic question remains: If America continues to act as the global Leviathan and plays the “Great Game” against China, Russia, Japan and others – does it have the economic and military will and resources to sustain its hegemonic position? Mackinder once said: “European civilization is, in a very real sense, the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion” (Mackinder, p.28). Are we to inherit the same 19th century philosophy? America must decide: Resist or yield to the imperial impulse. And if America pursues empire, is Brzezinski’s highly interventionist global game plan the one we want to use for our strategy?

—– —– —–

A confident and care free republic – the city on the hill, whose people have always believed that they are immune from history’s harms – now has to confront not only an unending imperial destiny but also a remote possibility that seems to haunt the history of empire: hubris followed by defeat.
Michael Ignatieff

Geopolitics can ennoble as well as corrupt. It can choose between two alternatives – the
value of power and the power of values.


Geopoliticians justify their proposals by asserting that war is the natural state of man. They present a recipe for the prosecution of war by geographic means.

Preemptive war against regimes that openly (opposes our rules) is our most important long-term goal in this struggleThomas Barnett


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Crowl, P. “Mahan: The Naval Historian.” pp. 444-477.

Fettweis, C. “Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century” Parameters. Summer 2000.

Gray, C. & Sloan, G. eds., Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 1-11, 161-77.

Hansen, D. “The Immutable Importance of Geography” Parameter, Spring 1997.

Haushofer, K. ”Why Geopolitik?” pp. 33-35.

Herwig, H. “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum.” pp. 218-241.

Janofsky, M. (2006). As Cuba plans offshore wells, some want U.S. to follow suit. The New York Times. Published May, 9, 2006. Available on the WWW at:

Knowlton, B. (2006). Global Image of the U.S. Is Worsening, Survey Finds. New York Times. Published: June 14, 2006. Availalbe on the WWW at

MacKinder, H. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” pp. 27-31.

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Owens, T. “In defense of classical geopolitics” Navel War College Review, Autumn 1999.

Parker, G. (1) Geopolitics: Past, Present, and Future (London: Pinter, 1998), “Chapter 3 ” pp. 24-57.

Parker, G. (2) “Mighty Opposites: The Bipolar World.” pp. 96-117.

Parker, G. (3) “War and the Fall of Geopolitik.” pp. 26-57.

Sloan, G. “Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now.” pp. 15-37.

Sprout, M. “Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power.” pp. 415-445.

Sumida, J. “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Geopolitician.” pp. 39-62.

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An Argument for Lifting the United States Embargo of Cuba

United States embargo of Cuba

American Military University

IRLS502 International Political Systems

Student: Peter Bakke

Originally created: 2006, reworked 


The United States has imposed an embargo on Cuba for the past 50 years. No other nation has incurred such long-standing punishment by the U.S. Why has Cuba, a nation approximately the size of the state of Virginia, aroused this long term enmity from the leader of the free world? Eleven U.S. presidents have presided over this sustained embargo, either unwilling or unable to change the status quo. Cuba’s political ideology offers a weak challenge to the liberal democratic and capitalistic tide that has swept across the world since the fall of the USSR in 1992. The economic cost of the embargo to Cuba has been estimated at $280 billion over the life of the embargo. The cost to the United States in potential trading revenues has been estimated at several billion dollars a year. Florida alone loses an estimated $1 billion a year in trade with Cuba (Weinmann 2004). Several Gulf port mayors have called for an end to the embargo in order to increase trade and create jobs in the United States. Despite pressures from some domestic corners and annual international pressure, the United States continues to enforce economic sanctions against Cuba.

Cuba has an annual GDP of $72 billion (CIA, 2012) while the Exxon corporation has annual revenues of more than $480 billion (Business Week, 2013). This comparison plus the discussion that follows will demonstrate that the sovereign nation of Cuba is neither an economic nor a political menace to the US. It is the thesis of this paper that US foreign policy towards Cuba, specifically the economic embargo, is likely driven by some other, non-economic and non-military, dynamic.

The US embargo has been unsuccessful in accomplishing its purpose of changing the Cuban regime. Accompanying this failure, the embargo has cast the U.S. in a poor light in the international community. This begs the question of why the U.S. continues to enforce a policy that has not worked for five decades, while at the same time bringing opprobrium from all corners of the international community. This international discredit has manifested itself at the United Nations, where the General Assembly has voted to condemn the Cuban embargo for 21 consecutive years by overwhelming majorities. The latest vote in November 2012, was 183 to 2 against the embargo (United Nations, 2012).

The primary argument of this paper is that domestic US politics is thwarting normal relations with Cuba. Specifically, the barrier to better relations with Cuba may be the result of presidential politics in the swing state of Florida. The 29 electoral votes of Florida are crucial to winning the US presidency. In order to win the state of Florida in the general election, one could argue that winning the Cuban émigré vote is a vital strategy for victory.

This presidential politics-foreign relations policy nexus is used by influential Cuban diaspora interest groups such as the Cuban Liberty Council, the American National Foundation, and other Cuban lobby groups (Sweig, 2003) to push their agenda, which has been identified as having two primary goals: 1) the return of nationalized assets to dispersed Cubans now living in the US and 2) to return to Cuba as its rulers. There are an estimated 800,000 Cuban Americans living in Florida, primarily in the “Little Havana” area of Miami. They are politically active and influential while tending to vote overwhelmingly Republican. George W. Bush was declared the winner (by a ruling of the US Supreme Court) in the state of Florida in the 2000 US election by a slim margin of 537 disputed votes, thus securing the presidency. Bush received over 80% of the Cuban American votes in Florida that November, well enough to help him offset Senator Al Gore’s advantage in the urban areas. Without this overwhelming majority of Republican Cuban American votes, Bush would not have beaten his opponent, former Vice-President Al Gore.  If Gore had been declared the winner of Florida’s electoral votes, he would have won the presidency.

The Cuban embargo is paradoxical when one looks at the US foreign policy history of the last 50 years. During a large segment of the Cuban embargo, the US engaged the Soviet Union, a mortal enemy. This interaction between diametrically opposed superpowers occurred during the apex of the Cold War. During the past few decades, the United States also has been actively engaging Communist China even though some scholars and politicians see China to be a growing hegemon in the Far East and note with concern that China has been making economic and military strides with friendly countries in the Western Hemisphere (Leiteritz, 2012) which is America’s traditional sphere of influence. The United States is also actively engaging Vietnam, a former enemy. We find today that the US is actively trading with Vietnam. It appears that US foreign policy is capable of radical change and rapprochement, but paradoxically not in the case of the small nation of Cuba.

Background of US-Cuban Relations

The United States and Cuba have a long history together. Cuba, like all Western Hemisphere nations, has been greatly affected throughout its existence by United States’ economic and security policies. Being only 90 miles from the US mainland, Cuba is influenced by its large neighbor to the north, just as the moon is affected by the gravity of the earth. Similar economic and political dyads can be observed between other large countries and nearby island nations such as China and Taiwan, Ireland and England, India and Sri Lanka. Along these lines, John Adams once remarked that Cuba had an unnatural attachment to Spain based on long geographic lines and that the inevitable natural result would be the eventual gravitation of Cuba toward the United States (Whittlesey, 1922).

The historical influence of Spain upon Cuba and the attempted Spanish hegemony deep into South and Central America has been seen by historians as a reaction to French and English forays into North America which needed counterbalancing. Nations compete for resources that support strong economies which in turn bolster strong militaries (Callahan, 2004). Spain was in a race with other European nations to exploit the New World to its own advantage. Some would argue that the race to carve up the Western Hemisphere was a classic case of European imperialism.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 resulted in the United States acquiring various Spanish colonies. These territories included Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. The United States militarily occupied Cuba for several years following the Spanish-American War. Following the US victory, there was a debate at the time whether the United States should add Cuba as a state. Since Cuba’s trade was already predominately with the United States, consisting primarily of sugar and rum, the US Congress decided in 1902 to grant Cuba its independence. However, this independence was granted with onerous conditions attached, one of which enabled the Unites States to interfere in Cuban internal affairs (Dominquez, 1997). In subsequent years, when unrest developed in Cuba, US troops reoccupied the country from 1906 to1909. Some Cuban nationalists complained that their country was as independent from the US as Long Island (Lowenthal, 1975). Many Americans agreed, concerned with continued US imperialism in the region. These concerns were exacerbated by additional US incursions into the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua in the coming decades. The acquisition of territory is a zero-sum game. The US made it clear to its European cousins that they were not to meddle in regional affairs which the United States deemed vital to its own national interests.

The concept of “American exceptionalism” was used in its westward expansion on the North American Continent and it was being used again in its imperialistic foreign policy regarding the Americas, Cuba included. The idea of “American exceptionalism” survives today in US foreign policy. This nationalistic view continues to color US relations with other nations in such a way that any challenge to this jingoistic view, foreign or domestic, is met with hostility – particularly from politicians on the right.

The 1959 popular revolution led by Castro replaced the unpopular and corrupt regime of Fulgencio Batista. Either Fidel or Raul Castro has headed the Cuban government since the overthrow of Batista. The United States government and even non-government entities have been interfering in Cuban internal affairs since the early 20th century. For example, the US-based Mafia established a significant presence in Cuba and was linked by various sources to US plots to kill Cuban leader Fidel Castro in the 1960’s (Wolske, 2000).

Since the revolution of 1959, the US has tried many times to change the Cuban regime by illegal means, including the abortive “Bay of Pigs” invasion of 1961 and also by assassination attempts, not in-frequently involving the Mafia. One can only surmise that the Mafia agreed to these activities in part because they were promised some type of quid pro quo when the Communist regime was overthrown. In addition, a terrorism program named “Operation Mongoose” was sanctioned by the US government (Husain, 2005) which involved over 400 Cuban exiles, many recruited from Florida. All attempts to overthrow the Cuban revolution failed.

The United States has publicly admitted that it continues to interfere with Cuban internal affairs, including the use of the Internet, printed materials, and radio and television signals (CubaNet, 2003). The US has also explicitly admitted that the overthrow of the Cuban government, specifically the Castro brothers, has been the driving force behind its Cuban policies (Department of State: US, 2004) The aggressive stance of the US towards Cuba, exemplified by the five decade-long embargo, is a reflection of realist paradigm that there are no morals in the anarchical realm of international relations, only self-interest. To quote Thucydides, “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”


Modern US-Cuban conflict began after the island’s 1959 revolution. This surprising regime change occurred during the Cold War and such a disturbing development across the Straits of Florida was disconcerting for the United States government. There was particular concern when the new Cuban government looked to the Soviet Union for assistance after being rebuffed by initial approaches to the US government. The fear of a Communist take-over “domino” effect in French Indo-China was a serious concern at the time and there was now a similar threat facing the United States and Western democracy in the Caribbean, Central, and South America. This unwelcomed changing of the guard was the beginning of America’s modern war-like attitude towards Cuba.

Concomitant Communist advances in Southeast Asia and in the southern Western Hemisphere may have served to harden US stances in both areas during this time. “Che” Guevara suggested in the 1960’s that revolutionaries should create two or three Vietnams for the US to handle at one time (Dominquez, 1997). It could be argued that U.S. policymakers were genuinely concerned about the spread of Communism during this era of Communist advances. At the time, the 1954 defeat of the French in Vietnam at Dien Ben Phu, plus memories of the Korean conflict, may have dampened calls to invade Cuba and forcibly overtake the government. Instead, an embargo was put in place that remains to this day. And as we have seen, covert actions were also put in place to destabilize the Cuban government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, for example, was a victory for the new Communist country against the US titan to the north and resulted in international diplomatic embarrassment for the United States. Finally, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis placed Cuba squarely between the national interests of the US and the USSR. The resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the removal of nuclear weapon-tipped ballistic missiles from Cuba, marked an important turning point between the two superpowers. This near cataclysmic event helped improve communications between the two superpowers and began the processes that led to the Strategic Arms Limitations agreements a decade later. In this sense, Cuba unwittingly helped serve as a catalyst for changing the essential dynamic between the two superpowers.

Current Situation

The United States has argued for decades that the Cuban government regularly violates many human rights of its citizens. This gives the US a moral reason to oppose the Cuban regime and argue that US policy is in place to help the Cuban people. However, many experts in the academic and policy world believe that morality should have no place in the international system. Perhaps the Cuban government is despised more by the U.S. (and Cuban exiles) because of its nationalization of industries and the taking of personal property after the 1959 revolution.

From an economic viewpoint, Cuba’s association with the USSR and the Eastern Bloc countries made up some 90% of its international trade (Purcell,1990). When the Soviet Union fell and lost control of its satellites, Cuba’s very existence was questioned. Cuba also relied on the USSR for military aid. The very fact that Cuba was able to survive this economic shock was surprising to many, but showed that austerity measures worked – and also showed the strength of Fidel Castro’s iron grip on his own citizens.

Current U.S.-Cuban relations could be seen as indicative of an unstable peace, which sometimes rises just short of conflict. The Levels-of-analysis approach suggests that relations between Cuba and the US can be understood by using the images of the international system, the nation, and the individual. The US-Cuban conflict as seen from the international level can be interpreted as a smaller nation caught in a classic power struggle between two larger powers, the USSR and the United States. After its revolution, Cuba naturally looked for power partners on the international stage once its diplomatic outreach to the US was rebuffed. The resulting long-term association with the USSR was a classic balance-of-power move to gain a strong partner that could help stave off any attacks by a large, bellicose neighbor.

Cuba has experienced difficult economic hardships since the breakup of the Soviet Union. It has had no hegemon partner to parry the economic might of the US. China apparently has no interest in getting deeply involved in a purely regional dispute involving the United States and Cuba. Russia is no longer in a position to help Cuba either. Therefore, at least on the international stage, Cuba has been relegated to using the United Nations to help it communicate the unjustness of the onerous provisions of the US economic embargo. For example, as mentioned above, Cuba has used the UN Assembly to embarrass the United States 21 years in a row by having the international community vote on lifting the embargo which is almost universally deemed to be unjust – but mere international embarrassment is far from capable of changing the US policy. Using the UN is not a realist gambit, but instead is a liberalist action to use an international institution to put pressure on the U.S. to abandon its embargo. The U.S. insists that the embargo is a bilateral dispute among nations. The UN votes are not binding in any way, so the US chooses to ignore them. Some have argued that this strategy may indicate that the Cuban government actually prefers a constant “cold war” with the U.S. in order to maintain political cover internally and internationally (Borer & Bowen, 2007).

At the nation-level of analysis, Castro and other authoritarian rulers use the fear of national enemies to influence its citizens. The fear of invasion from the U.S. has certainly been used to rally the Cuban population, sometimes for good reason. Several generations of Cubans have grown up with a deep-seated fear and hatred of the United States, similar to many nations in the Mideast. This is an ongoing problem that U.S. policy must address if American exceptionalism is to work successfully off U.S. shores. Winning hearts and minds is always a difficult and prolonged business.

Fidel Castro and his brother Raul represent the individual-level of analysis in Cuban affairs. The individual has much more freedom of action in an authoritarian regime than a democratic government. There are fewer, if any, institutions in the way of economic, military, or political action. It remains to be seen whether Raul Castro cultivates a ‘hero’ status as his brother Fidel did, but the Castro patriarchy continues to persist in Havana despite all attempts to depose it from afar and internally. Cuban leadership has survived eleven U.S. presidents – from Eisenhower to Obama – in addition to the punishing embargo.

Cuban Refugees and the Embargo

Economic embargoes are not expressly prohibited by The United Nations Charter. The Cuban economic embargo has not changed the country’s regime but it has kept Cuba a poor and impoverished country. Economic embargoes are seen by some as only one tool, short of military coercion, that can be used to punish perceived adversaries. It is the most vulnerable of people of Cuba who are suffering due to the embargo – the sick, the elderly, and the very young. International organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the embargo because of its effect upon these vulnerable populations, among other issues (Lopez-Levy, 2011).

Some scholars believe that the U.S. has misapplied economic sanctions to Cuba, stating that only multinational embargos have any chance of being effective (Gordon, 2012). They also claim that the embargo is ‘extraterritorial,’ meaning that it affects third countries trading with Cuba. This has caused ire amongst traditional U.S. friends (and foes) alike. For example, Canada and other countries have strenuously argued that the embargo in its current form flaunts international law. For example, any cargo ship that enters a Cuban port cannot enter a U.S. port for 180 days. If the ship enters a U.S. port within this timeframe, it is subject to confiscation. This is seen as an illegal form of a unilateral embargo that affects the ability of third party nations to conduct commerce. There are also embargo implications for international banking, mergers, and acquisitions, and the inability of Cuba to join financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. This is contrary to the U.S. profession of inclusiveness in the community of nations. Finally, others have argued that US policies, including the embargo, have undeniably retarded the democratic development of Cuba (Landau, 2009).

Strangely, the US has in place a policy that mitigates certain aspects of the Cuban embargo. This policy is to allow tens of thousands of Cubans to immigrate each year to the United States. To many, this policy acts as a kind of release valve for internal political and economic dissent that would otherwise build up inside Cuba and perhaps cause a change in leadership to occur. This “release valve” policy could be seen as a way to keep Cuban leadership in power. For example, an exodus of over 120,000 Cubans was allowed to cross over to the United States in 1980 during what has become known as the Mariel boatlift operation  (Fernández, 2007).

The United States is pressuring Cuba economically while paradoxically enabling a yearly Cuban immigrant quota. Remittances by Cuban exiles in the US that are sent back to Cuba to provide a much-needed injection of cash for its economy, which again acts as another release valve for the Cuban state. In addition, the US embargo is not supported by many nations, including the European Union, which in turn erodes the effectiveness of the economic sanctions.

Since the Cuban revolution, tens of thousands of exiles have entered the U.S. The majority of them, some 90%, have emigrated to the United States, mainly to Florida and to New Jersey. Exiled Cubans have generally been economically successful in the U.S. In the year 2000, total revenues of Cuban-American businesses in the U.S. exceeded that of the entire nation of Cuba (Eckstein, 2005). Cuban voting patterns in Florida helped the Republican ticket win the state in both the presidential races of 2000 and 2004.

It can be argued that better relations with Cuba could actually help topple the Communist regime. After all, the US decided to engage the USSR, China, and Vietnam. Why not Cuba? Cuban leadership uses the punitive US actions to protect itself from internal strife. The nation’s ills, from poverty to a lack of modern medical equipment can all be blamed, rightly or wrongly, upon the U.S. embargo and other U.S. actions. By removing the 50-year old embargo, the United States could also remove one of the primary rationales given by the Cuban government for the failures of socialism. The Cuban government has been using this excuse for fifty years.

Possible Future Muddied by US Presidential Politics

There does not appear to be much if any internal US debate regarding lifting the Cuban embargo. The few that are arguing for the normalization of relations appear to be utilizing arguments based upon the tenets of liberalism. They see some successes in this area such as the recent American experiences with China, Vietnam, and Russia. The primary idea behind this philosophy is that regime change can occur if the US engages softly with antagonistic nations rather than punitively (Nye, 2004). The US is not going to invade Cuba, absent a Syria-like humanitarian crisis, therefore, what are the U.S. policy alternatives to effect regime change?

A potential answer to help end the U.S.-Cuban impasse is to immediately stop the embargo. If one imagines an end to the embargo, it would alleviate the suffering of the general population of Cuba and would bring laurels to the U.S. The yearly votes at the UN Assembly clearly indicate that the world would see a compassionate U.S. helping its neighbor in need. Having set a precedent of dealing with other Communist nations, opponents of the ending of economic sanctions would have little ammunition with which to argue their opposition. If there isn’t a plan to militarily change the Cuban regime, which no competent scholar or military tactician believes exists, then the road is wide open to attempt a new approach to U.S.-Cuba relations. If there is any hope or belief that economically and culturally engaging non-democratic states leads to stabilization and peace, as arguably has happened with the former Eastern Bloc, Russia, China, and Vietnam, then a new era of US-Cuban relations should begin posthaste.

The main problem blocking this potential future of cooperative US-Cuban relations is the political heft of hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles living (and voting) in the United States, particularly in the important swing state of Florida. This group of exiled Cubans may be single-handedly keeping improved US-Cuban relations at bay. Lopez-Levy (2011) has indicated that the primary reason behind long-standing punitive US actions is the revenge-driven desire of Cuban exiles to regain their property taken in the 1959 revolution. Another reason may be that many Cuban exiles see themselves as the rightful heirs to positions of high authority in a ‘new’ Cuba. Prominent American Cubans have publicly stated that they expect to rule in Cuba once its current government collapses (Lopez-Levy, 2011). Current US policy (meaning the embargo) won’t change as long as Florida continues to be a battleground state in presidential elections (Abrams & Rangel, 1998), which does not appear to be changing any time soon.

The influence of the exiled Cuban lobby was exhibited in 1998 when there was an attempt to stifle a US government report that indicated that Cuban military capabilities were not a concern for the region (Ratliff & Fontaine, 2000). The report almost did not see the light of day. When it was eventually released, it was accompanied by a special note, from then-Secretary of Defense Cohen, which was seen as a roundabout way to mollify the ire of the Cuban lobby (Ratliff and Fontaine, 2000).

So the stalemate continues, with hardliners in both Havana and Washington insisting that the other is to blame for hostile relations. Lifting an anachronistic and punitive embargo first enacted in 1959 during the height of the Cold War could go a long way in helping to restore the U.S.’s tarnished image resulting from two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and its imperialistic legacy too well known in the Americas.





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